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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Virginia Woolf's novel M r s .
Dalloway and offers an explanation for Woolf's
juxtaposition of the two seemingly unrelated narratives of
Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway. This paper suggests
that the juxtaposition facilitates Woolf's examination of
the social structure, a structure which depends upon the
limitation and control of knowledge for its maintenance.
Michel Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" provides the
theoretical structure necessary to study Woolf's characters
as participants in the various language systems which
categorize and limit knowledge.

VIRGINIA WOOLF'S MRS. DALLOWAY:
INTERPRETATION, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway tells two distinct
stories— those of Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway—
which directly intersect only momentarily near the end of
the novel.

Some critics regard this as a structural flaw,

others as a deliberate and effective choice on Woolf's part.
Critics who assume the validity of Woolf's organizational
choice offer differing explanations for the juxtaposition of
the two narratives.

Phyllis Rose reads the novel as an

autobiographical document portraying the artist's plight;
the two narratives elucidate the fine line

"between a kind

of divine intoxication which is the basis of all creativity
and insanity pure and simple" (Rose 12 6).

Jeremy Tambling

identifies another unifying theme for the two narratives—
male and female homosexuality (149).

He suggests that the

relationship between Clarissa and Sally Seton parallels that
of Septimus and Evans.

Thus, the juxtaposition highlights

divergent methods for repressing homosexual impulses.
Deborah Guth finds a link between

Septimus and Clarissa in

the motif of "ascent and descent"

(18).

The opposition of

the two emphasizes the inadequacy of Clarissa's life:

while

Septimus soars (and descends) to a world beyond social
confines, Clarissa remains strictly within societal bounds.
Explanations such as these often overlook the novel's
broader social implications.

While Guth does direct her

attention to Clarissa's steadfastadherence to social mores,
she fails to provide a comprehensive and specific study
2

of
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Septimus, Clarissa, and the numerous social pressures
operating on and linking the two characters.
Woolf does not stop with the particularity of class
systems, the artist's role, the plight of the homosexual, or
the role of women, but rather exposes the very structure of
power in Western society, a power based on the logical and
rational acquisition and possession of knowledge.1 Woolf's
characters enforce interpretations on others in an assertion
of power typical of Western society.

Mrs. Dalloway makes it

clear that the powerful members of society maintain the
rather tenuous status quo by regulating knowledge and the
power accruing its possession.

The two narratives of

definitions for the following terms derive from Michel
Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" and are discussed in
greater detail later: knowledge, interpretation, truth, and
force.
Foucault assumes that knowledge is nothing more than
a function of the language used to articulate it. An infinite
number of intersecting and diverging "discourses" or language
systems produce knowledge.
In this sense, knowledge is only
knowledge if it adheres to the restrictions of the particular
discourse employed.
Personal interpretations couched in
acceptable terminology may assume the guise of "knowledge" or
"truth." In this paper, "interpretation" is used to identify
such personal efforts to explain meaning within a power-full
discourse. "Knowledge" and "truth" note interpretations which
have been successfully articulated within a discourse. In this
sense, knowledge is nothing more than interpretation.
The
paper examines instances in which personages of power utilize
personal interpretations presented in the language of a
particular discourse in order to maintain the status quo. For
example, Doris Kilman interprets Mrs. Dalloway as a shallow,
frivolous, and proud woman.
This interpretation carries no
weight since Ms. Kilman is a disenfranchised individual;
however, when expressed in the rhetoric of Christianity,
Kilman's view of the "lost and sinful" Clarissa Dalloway gains
validity as "truth" or "knowledge" because the discourse of
Christianity bears a significance within the culture which
Kilman's own views cannot attain.
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Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway present two individuals
differing in gender, class, education, and experience, and
the interpretive agents that constrict and mold them and
limit or expand their access to power.
Woolf*s literary theories and personal experience
provide ample justification for a reading of the novel as a
document exposing the use and abuse of knowledge to maintain
social status and power.

An analogy can be drawn between

Woolf*s denunciation of Edwardian narrative constraints and
her novel *s attack on the powers that contain knowledge.
Woolf writes in her 1925 essay, "Modern Fiction":

"The

writer seems constrained, not by his own free will but by
some powerful and unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall"
(The Common Reader 149).

Woolf denounces narrative

convention as the tyrant which limits artistic endeavors to
articulate meaning, much as she exposes figures in M r s .
Dalloway who hinder and/or force compliance with established
truths and ways of speaking of truth.

Admittedly, Woolf's

comments address a very specific area of literary concern;
yet, her statement reveals a general distaste for
limitations on the creative process, whether it be the
production of a novel or the production of knowledge.
Woolf's frustration with the restriction of individual
expression is not limited to aesthetics.

Through her own

experience, Woolf developed a fierce hatred for those who
force the psyche or, as she terms it, "force the soul."
Woolf sent the proofs of Mrs. Dalloway to her friend Jacques
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Raverat.

In their notes to The Letters of Virginia Woolf,

editors Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann recount that
Raverat's wife Gwen wrote back to Woolf and remarked on the
novel's mad scenes (Letters, v.3, p. 153).

Woolf writes in

reply, "It was a subject that I have kept cooling in my mind
until I felt I could touch it without bursting into flame
all over.

You can't think what a raging furnace it is still

to me— madness and doctors and being forced" (Letters 180).
Woolf specifically refers to the rest cure she experienced
as prescribed treatment for depression.

While her comment

appears to confront an abstract affront to the individuality
of the soul, it is a reference to the particular
restrictions of diet, exercise, and writing insisted upon by
her physicians.

Woolf's words suggest at the very least an

impatience with efforts to impose socially determined
restrictions on the personal, intellectual freedom of an
individual.

Woolf's use of the word "force" echoes language

she employs throughout the novel in relation to individuals
who limit and impose knowledge on others.
Alex Zwerdling has set a critical precedent for
examining Woolf's commentary on society in Mrs. Dalloway.
He offers as evidence this guotation from Woolf's diary:

"I

want to criticise the social system, and to show it at work,
at its most intense"

(57).

While Zwerdling draws attention

to an important aspect of Woolf's work, he does limit the
scope of his argument to Woolf's treatment of the ruling
political class and its relationship to the intellectual
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aristocracy of England.

I would argue that Woolf's censure

of society extends beyond class relations to an examination
of the ideological structure supporting society.

Mrs.

Dalloway exposes various individuals responsible for
maintaining power by limiting and controlling the production
of knowledge.

Her novel indicts those who employ force to

impose meaning upon other characters.

In this sense the

bourgeois Holmes, the nouveau riche Bradshaw, and even the
penniless Miss Kilman, regardless of their class, all
participate in a larger social system which Woolf
criticizes.
French linguist and historian Michel Foucault examines
the way in which collective acceptance and regulation of
knowledge perpetuate this social system.

Like Woolf's

novel, Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" questions basic
assumptions regarding language, knowledge, and power.

He

identifies and rejects the assumption that meaning and
knowledge exist as "truth" free from the subjective biases
of language.

He suggests that truth itself is only a

function of the language used to articulate it.

Foucault

refutes the Platonic notion, still prevalent today, that
truth or knowledge reign outside and independent of the
cultural and social contexts which taint language.

On the

contrary, Foucault suggests that language itself determines
knowledge and truth.
Foucault defines the term "discourse" as the language
systems humans use to produce knowledge.

While Platonic
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models take ideal truth as an a priori given, Foucault
assumes the human need to control, limit, and create
/
knowledge within specific parameters.
Knowledge does not
and cannot exist outside discourse, which structures and
limits where, when, what, how, and, most importantly, which
people can acquire and utilize knowledge and the power it
yields.

Knowledge is not something that conforms to

discourse so much as it is a product of the way humans talk
about things.

In Foucault's schema, knowledge yields power

precisely because, by definition, it is a limited commodity-one that not everyone can possess.
Foucault's model clearly assumes the necessity of an
ordered discourse.

Foucault suggests that humans find the

very uncertainty of existence highly disconcerting.

This

general uncertainty may originate in the possibility that
meaning is limitless and truth infinite.

Humans respond by

establishing limitations and institutions which enforce such
limits.

For example, religions enforce specific guidelines

for the nature of truth and provide codes of behavior to
ensure spiritual salvation in another world free from
uncertainty.

Governments offer security on a secular level

by dictating correct civic behavior and protecting humans
from each other.

The unwritten guidelines governing the

production of knowledge also purport to maintain the
stability of a culture.
Foucault analyzes this web of discourses and identifies
what he terms "procedures of exclusion" which restrict the
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production of knowledge, meaning, and truth:

the

prohibition, the opposition of reason and madness, and the
opposition of true and false.

The first of these means of

exclusion, the prohibition, groups under one heading the
basic restrictions experienced by humans when speaking.

The

opposition of reason and madness controls potentially more
damaging elements in society by labeling as "mad” those who
differ from the norm.

The opposition of true and false

successfully negates ideas or practices which challenge what
humans accept as knowledge by labelling them "false."
The first of these procedures of exclusion, the
prohibition, includes restrictions on the topics, the
occasions for speech, and on which individuals have the
right to speak on certain privileged topics.

A reciprocal

relationship exists between the privileged speaker and the
privileged topic:

the speaker gains power because he/she

has the right to address certain topics, and at the same
time, the topic gains authority because only certain
individuals can talk about it.

Foucault cites politics and

sexuality as two examples of privileged topics, topics which
carry with them numerous restrictions on not only who
addresses them but also on when and where such discussions
may take place.

Foucault argues that the treatment of these

two topics within discourse indicates the degree to which
the production of meaning is, in fact, dominated by the
forces of power and desire, not an a priori truth.
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While strict prohibitions concerning the circumstances
of speech limit discourse considerably, a second principle
of exclusion eliminates a more dangerous threat to the
ordered discourse.

The opposition of reason and madness

reinforces the social hierarchy and at the same time labels
as "mad” that which does not conform to "normal" limits on
behavior, such as those identified by religious,
governmental, and other institutional bodies.

This

opposition emphasizes the prominent role of language in
maintaining social structures, for it is the madman's words
which constitute his difference from the system:

"It was

through his words that his madness was recognized:

they

were the place where the division between reason and madness
was exercised" (1155).

Foucault notes that as the twentieth

century institutionalized the treatment of the mentally ill,
it created a new discourse to rationalize the madman's
speech and give it meaning.

Psychoanalysis strips madness

of its threatening aspects and confines it to scientific
inquiry.

More importantly, psychoanalysis validates itself

by its ability to discover "truth" or meaning in the
madman's initially indecipherable and therefore potentially
subversive speech.
Foucault classifies this "will to truth," the
compulsion to discern meaning in all language usage, as the
third principle of exclusion, the opposition of true and
false.

The western will to truth denies the arbitrariness

of truth and its historical production (1156).

Plato's
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rejection of the Sophists* arguments determined that "the
highest truth no longer resided in what discourse was or
did, but in what it said" (1156).

Thus, truth masquerades

as an a priori given free from the biases of desire and
power which characterize language use.

As with the other

procedures of exclusion, the will to truth "rests on an
institutional support:

it is both reinforced and renewed by

a whole strata of practices"

(1157).

The institution

dictates that truth must conform to the limitations
established by the discourse.

Just as institutions and

their authorities use the term "mad" to exclude and contain
individuals who threaten social stability, so they also
employ the term "false" to negate ideas or practices which
challenge what humans accept as knowledge.
Foucault makes a distinction between "the truth" and
being "within the true" by turning to history for an
example.

While today's scientific community accepts Gregor

Mendel's genetic theories as "truth," his peers rejected
those theories because they did not conform to the current
"conceptual instruments" or "theoretical foundations."
Despite the fact that Mendel's discoveries are "true," he
was not "in the true" during his lifetime because his model
operated outside the established frame of reference or
discourse for biological meaning (1161).

Human

institutions mistakenly equate things or ideas that are
simply "within the true" with the "truth."

Foucault notes,

"One is 'in the true' only by obeying the rules of a
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discursive 'policing'” (1161).

Therefore, truth has very

little to do with the actual veracity of a statement and
much more to do with whether or not the statement
corresponds to current patterns of thinking.
A fear of the unlimited proliferation of meaning
motivates the urge to restrict discourse:
It is just as if prohibitions, barriers,
thresholds, and limits had been set up in order to
master, at least partly, the great proliferation
of discourse, in order to remove from its richness
the most dangerous part, and in order to organize
its disorder according to figures which dodge what
is most uncontrollable about it.

(1164)

Foucault argues that personal, political, and institutional
concerns control the discourses which produce knowledge.
Mrs. Dalloway. we can indeed trace this pattern.

In

Woolf's

characters each produce readings based on their personal and
communal predisposition.

While all the characters share

this quality, some do not attempt to force their readings
onto others.

On the other hand, some characters make it

their business to do precisely that.

These persons confine

meaning within the limitations of collective knowledge in
order to maintain societal stability and avoid the dangers
suggested by the possibility of infinite meaning:

namely,

that restrictions on behavior become invalid if meaning has
no boundaries and if there is no one "truth” on any subject.
Foucault writes:
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In every society the production of discourse is at
once controlled, selected, organized, and
redistributed by a certain number of procedures
whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers,
to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade
its ponderous, formidable materiality.

(1155)

Foucault uses the phrase "ward off," suggesting that the
parameters of discourses cannot categorically control or
streamline the production of knowledge.

Foucault's model is

one of numerous layers and intersections, not a monolithic
construction dominated by some formal intellectual policing.
Nonetheless, discourses do function to produce knowledge and
meaning within established norms.
Mrs. Dalloway presents characters involved in moments
of interpretive conflict which correspond to the
constraining aspects of discourse Foucault identifies.

The

conflict between Septimus and his doctors illustrates what
Foucault identifies as the prohibition against madness and
its consequences; that conflict, in turn, illuminates the
way Mrs. Dalloway is more subtly constrained by the
prohibitions and restrictions of the discourses in which she
lives.

An examination of the discursive forces affecting

Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway explains the
juxtaposition of their two stories.

Woolf clearly attacks

interpretive force by showing stereotypical villains
confronting the pathetic victim.

However, the complexities

of Mrs. Dalloway and her set highlight the difficulties
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attending any attempt to escape from the interpretive
constraints of the social structure.
Two early scenes in Mrs. Dalloway emphasize the
limitations governing interpretation and point to the
usefulness of Foucault*s essay as a tool for reading Woolf's
novel.

In the first scene, an unidentified car passes and

by-standers speculate about its occupants.

The second scene

presents the crowd's evolving interpretation of sky-writing.
The "readings" in both scenes suggest that interpretation
and knowledge appear highly diverse, but are, in fact,
produced within culturally determined parameters.

Woolf's

pointed reference to the professions of the observers in the
first scene underlines the remarkable uniformity of
interpretation despite the varied backgrounds and
professions of the onlookers.

Rezia Smith, the young

immigrant wife, wonders, "Was it the Queen in there— the
Queen going shopping?" and, Edgar J. Watkiss "said audibly,
humorously of course:
21).

'The Proime Minister's kyar'"

(2 0-

Clarissa Dalloway herself concludes, "It is probably

the Queen"

(23).

When the chauffeur shows a card to the

policeman, Mrs. Dalloway admits uncertainty by acknowledging
that the card could be "inscribed with a name,— the Queen's,
the Prince of Wales's, the Prime Minister's?"

(24-25).

This

apparent uncertainty exists within reassuring boundaries,
however, as Clarissa lists very specific and limited options
for the car's occupants— members of the British ruling
elite.

Rezia Smith, a milliner, Edgar J. Watkiss, a
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laborer, and Clarissa Dalloway, a wealthy housewife, all
conclude that the occupant must be some member of the ruling
class.

In Foucault's terms, they interpret within

acceptable guidelines.

An object requires interpretation— a

luxurious car with shaded windows to which even the
policeman gives deference.

No one suggests that such a car

could contain a charwoman or even a wealthy underworld
figure.

These possibilities cannot exist "in the true" and

are never considered as solutions to the interpretive
dilemma the car presents.

No, it must carry a personage of

wealth, closely affiliated with power and the law as
indicated by the policeman's salute.

The incident ends
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without establishing any definitive interpretation.

Woolf

never indicates who actually occupies the car, suggesting
that truth often has very little to do with fact or reality
and much more to do with the discourse restrictions on what
can and cannot be true.
The sky-writing incident provides another occasion to
observe individual interpretations.

As with the car,

interpretations of the sky-writing develop within
predictable limits.

The observers immediately assign the

writing a generic classification.

They know to interpret

the sky-writing as an advertisement and begin suggesting
trade names, "Glaxo" or "Kreemo."

In addition, the

assumption underlying these interpretive suggestions is that
the words will undoubtedly offer meaning.

When the sky

writing begins, Woolf writes, "Everyone looked up" (29).

This simple statement emphasizes the human desire to
interpret, categorize, and assign meaning.

Such responses

confirm Foucault*s assessment of the overwhelming human
compulsion to establish meaning.

Both the car and sky

writing incidents set the tone for Woolf's exploration of
the interpretive process throughout the novel.

The

similarity of interpretation in the two scenes points to the
usefulness of Foucault's writings to a study of M r s .
Dalloway.
These early scenes present readings that loosely
approximate an interpretive norm.

There is little conflict

over differing readings because each individual offers
interpretations that fit societal expectations.

The

treatment of Septimus Smith moves Woolf's examination of
interpretation to a level where more is at stake than idle
speculation about cars and sky-writing.

Traumatized by his

own loss of feeling during World War I, Septimus appears
unable to interpret within the "normal” limits of societal
discourse.

He unwittingly rejects society's discourse of

power and knowledge.

In its place, Septimus adopts a

discourse of knowledge rooted in the visionary.

Septimus's

keen sensitivity to the natural world renders him tragically
dysfunctional in terms of societal norms.

However, the

veteran, consumed by his loss of feeling, finds in nature
the only connection he can make with a fragmented and
violent world.

While others around him puzzle over the
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problem of interpreting the sky writing, Septimus examines a
different text— nature, the trees, the birds:
The sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in
jagged fountains were part of the pattern; the
white and blue, barred with black branches.
Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the
spaces between them were as significant as the
sounds.

(33)

Septimus's thoughts rather efficiently dispel traditional
models of knowing.

Generally, interpretive energies

concentrate on substance, not emptiness; a passing car, sky
writing, or the music of the birds merit interpretation, not
necessarily the silence between the songs.
reverses such tendencies.

Septimus

For him, the pauses between the

bird's songs are as meaningful and significant as the music
itself.

As Foucault indicates, in Western ideology, humans

may interpret within a specific discourse as long as they
adhere to a number of limitations— language, grammar,
reason, material reality.

Septimus to some degree

disregards these boundaries and attempts to find meaning in
other alternatives.

Even Septimus, however, utilizes

traditional elements of the interpretive process.

While he

elevates the visionary, he does so by employing tactics of
the rational world.

He notes that the sparrows are part of

a "pattern," just as the observers in the earlier scenes
find a pattern— a narrow list of possible car occupants or a
genre for the sky-writing.

Similarly, the sounds Septimus
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hears do not form dissonances, but harmonies which are
examples of musical patterns.

Thus, although Septimus

operates outside the discourse of power and knowledge, he
unconsciously continues to utilize elements of the
discourse.
Woolf*s highly ironic account of Septimus before the
war gives the reader a clearer sense of his change after the
war.

As a young, self-instructed intellectual, he exhibits

a tendency toward romantic idealism, even likening himself
to Keats (128).

Seeking access to the circle of the

intellectual elite, Septimus reads Darwin and Shakespeare,
acquiring the language and knowledge necessary to belong.
Consequently, Woolf writes that when war broke out,
"Septimus was one of the first to volunteer.

He went to

France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of
Shakespeare's plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress
walking in a square" (130).

Woolf's irony highlights the

naivete characterizing Septimus as well as many other
volunteer soldiers.

Septimus returns without his idealism,

emotionally maimed, and unable to "feel."
Like many shell-shock victims, Septimus, frightened by
his own loss of sympathy with other humans, leaves the war
disillusioned with the old values.

His case provides an

example of how a loss of communal values leads to insanity,
unhappiness, and isolation.

A victim of the horrors of

modern war, Septimus has lost his ability to accept the way
most people see and understand things.
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Despite conflicting impulses, Septimus operates
primarily outside the established rules for understanding
the world.

An ordered discourse limits both the way things

are said and what can be said.
prohibitions.

Septimus disregards both

While sitting on a park bench, he muses, "Men

must not cut down trees.

There is a God.

revelations on the backs of envelopes.)
No one kills from hatred.
(35).

(He noted such
Change the world.

Make it known (he wrote it down)"

While each declaration on its own is logical, it is

the lack of transition which renders the progression itself
illogical.

Septimus does not order his thoughts logically

or rationally, and the simple imperative, "Change the
world," could clearly threaten social norms if Septimus ever
joined his words with actions.

Septimus continues to

repudiate the socially valuated oppositions upon which
Foucault suggests an ordered society is based, love/hate and
good/evil:
The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet;
first that trees are alive; next there is no
crime; next love, universal love, he muttered,
gasping, trembling, painfully drawing out these
profound truths which needed, so deep were they,
so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but
the world was entirely changed by them for ever.
(1 0 2 )
Notably, even Septimus cannot resist the desire to make his
insights an accepted "truth" by declaring them to the
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Cabinet.

However, because his words do not conform to the

order of discourse dictating what can be "in the true," they
cannot possibly be regarded as truth.

The principle of

"universal love" is belied by the fervor of war and the
statement that there is "no crime" would seem equally
untenable.
Regardless, Septimus experiences the powerful need to
record personal truth through writing.
Septimus fumbles for a card and pencil.

While thinking,
Later, of course,

Dr. Bradshaw will have a card at hand to record information
about Septimus*s symptoms.

The repetition of the card

encourages the reader to compare Septimus1s use of writing
with that of Dr. Bradshaw*s.

While Bradshaw notes symptoms

in order to categorize and confine the mental instability of
Septimus, Septimus uses language in a less systematic
fashion.
Septimus strikes at what Foucault identifies as the
heart of the discourse of power— the will to truth (1156).
Septimus muses, "It might be possible that the world itself
is without meaning"

(133).

Septimus denies that

interpretation can have any real purpose since the goal of
the interpretive process and the discourse governing its
operation is to find meaning.

The physicians Holmes and

Bradshaw who both classify and explain do assume the
existence of meaning.

Septimus, on the other hand,

questions one of the assumptions underlying the
establishment of any social structure.

By questioning
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meaning, he challenges society*s system of ordering,
prerogative for power, and reason for being.

Indeed, it is

through interpretations that characters in the novel
frequently justify themselves; thus Septimus's comment
undermines both collective meaning and individual
significance.

When confronted with such talk, the powerful
1

elite have two choices:

Holmes's to refuse to take such

ravings seriously, or Bradshaw's to label the speaker insane
and exclude him from

contact with society.

With the introduction of the two doctors, Woolf makes
the dangers of interpretive force clear, and at the same
time illustrates the necessity of interpretation to
existence.

Some critics argue that Woolf's characterization

of the novel's physicians originates in her own unhappy
experience with psychiatric treatment.

Sue Thomas notes

that critics read "Woolf's treatment of Septimus Smith's
mental illness as a reflection of her anger at the rest
cures prescribed for her during her own mental breakdowns in
1913 and 1915" (49).

As a result, the two characters,

Holmes and Bradshaw, suffer from the sharpness of Woolf's
ironic pen.

In Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw, Woolf creates

caricatures of the bumbling general practitioner and the
social-climbing, highly trained specialist.

However,

Woolf's portrayals of the doctors are more than simple
ironic sketches.

Woolf makes quite clear their partial

responsibility for Septimus Smith's death.

They are, at the

very least, agents for the system which destroys Septimus.
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Not born to the ruling elite, Sir William Bradshaw uses
knowledge to earn him power and society's approbation.

With

the approval of society, Dr. Bradshaw controls those
elements which threaten social norms. Woolf articulates the
origin of Bradshaw's power:
Sir William not only prospered himself but made
England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade
childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible
for the unfit to propagate their views until they,
too, shared his sense of proportion.

(150)

As Foucault notes, the preservation of communal institutions
demands the exclusion of the mad, a job Bradshaw performs
with the blessing of the ruling class.
fact, earned him a title.

His labors have, in

In her assessment of the politics

of Woolf's novel, Pamela Transue elaborates this perspective
on Bradshaw: "By labelling all dissenting voices as sick, he
consolidates his vision in society" (97).

While she

articulates well the nature of Bradshaw's work, Transue's
appraisal does not hold society accountable in the way Woolf
clearly does.
simply his own.

Bradshaw epitomizes society's "vision," not
In addition, Bradshaw himself combines

several conflicting discourses to power.

While he has won

society's approval through his professional service, he
yearns for acceptance by the social elite.

His social-

climbing tactics make him the butt of Woolf's irony and only
a marginally welcome guest at Clarissa's party.
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Nevertheless, Bradshaw's interaction with the Smiths
aligns him with the power of the ruling elite.

A well-

appointed motor car idles outside his office when Rezia and
Septimus Smith first arrive.

This detail should remind

readers of the earlier scene in which the mysterious motor
car with "dove-gray upholstery" prompts numerous
interpretations from bystanders (19).

The car operates as a

symbol tying Bradshaw explicitly to the power of the ruling
class.

Woolf's repetition of the grey car invites readers

to compare the earlier scene with what takes place in Dr.
Bradshaw's office.

While the bystanders supply

interpretations which fit a pattern of "normal" readings,
Septimus Smith cannot do this because of his progressive
mental breakdown and, more importantly, his failure to share
the basic assumptions governing the interpretations of the
bystanders.

For example, he does not necessarily assume

that skywriting must have a meaning.

Therefore, Dr.

Bradshaw must help Smith conform to social norms.
Bradshaw displays his professional efficiency only two
or three minutes into the interview when he determines
categorically:

"It was a case of complete breakdown—

complete physical and nervous breakdown, with every symptom
in an advanced stage, he ascertained . . . (writing answers
to questions, murmured discreetly, on a pink card)" (144).
Justifying society's trust in him, Bradshaw tags Septimus as
"a case of complete breakdown" and takes the first step in
returning Septimus to the interpretive norms maintained by
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society.

Bradshaw's

move corresponds to what Foucault

identifies as the opposition of reason and madness, one of
the mechanisms operating to maintain social order.
Certainly, Bradshaw acts in accordance with the demands of
his profession.

However, his treatment of Septimus points

to the limitations of the medical profession.

While the

doctor must diagnose the patient in order to suggest a cure,
there is a danger in the inaccuracy and misattribution of
labels.

Woolf highlights a problem inherent in discourse

systems like the medical profession— in order to effect
cures, medical knowledge must be accepted as "truth," yet,
often, this truth is only partial at best.
Bradshaw continues to question Septimus, "You served
with great distinction in the War?" (145).

Instead of

answering the question, Septimus repeats "the word 'war'
interrogatively"

(145).

At this, Bradshaw concludes, "He

[Septimus] was attaching meanings to words of a symbolical
kind.

A serious symptom, to be noted on the card" (145).

Although Septimus is perfectly logical in repeating a
question, Bradshaw notes this as a "serious symptom."
Bradshaw's assessment leads to several questions:

Why is

attaching symbolical meanings a symptom of madness?
does Dr. Bradshaw term this a "serious symptom"?

Dr.

Why

Septimus's

interrogative repetition of the word "war" could suggest
that meaning may very well be limitless and wholly relative.
If this is the case, then Septimus's symbolic meaning
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violates what Foucault notes as the unconscious need for
established meaning, order, and limitations on truth.
To fulfill society*s mandate to regulate such a threat,
Bradshaw must classify, interpret, and "read" Septimus.

He

must force Septimus to accept, either by default or
volition, the interpretation society demands for its
perpetuation.

Sir William tells Rezia, "He [Septimus] had

threatened to kill himself.
was a question of law" (146).

There was no alternative.

It

By invoking the "law,"

Bradshaw reveals the mechanism operating beneath the veneer
of psychiatric expertise and solicitude for the well-being
of his client.

In effect, Septimus has violated society's

code, broken the law, and must be punished.

It is

Bradshaw's duty to enforce the "cure" which in Foucault's
terms consists of exclusion from society.
Bradshaw's reading, although clothed in the robes of
professional prerogative and societal duty, grows out of
personal prejudices as surely as does Septimus's symbolical
understanding of the word "war."

Bradshaw resents Septimus

as a threat to society, but more importantly, as an affront
to his own system of values:
The fellow made a distasteful impression.

For

there was in Sir William, whose father had been a
tradesman, a natural respect for breeding and
clothing, which shabbiness nettled; again, more
profoundly, there was in Sir William, who had
never had time for reading, a grudge, deeply
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buried, against cultivated people who came into
his room and intimated that doctors, whose
profession is a constant strain upon all the
highest faculties, are not educated men.

(147)

Bradshaw’s personal insecurities fuel his inclination to
isolate Septimus and urge him to use the power of his
knowledge to show this troubled intellectual who really is
in control.

Thus, Septimus is forced into a rest cure which

may or may not help him. As Dr. Bradshaw concludes, "One of
my homes, Mr. Warren Smith . . . will teach you to rest"
(147)

[emphasis mine].

Bradshaw seeks refuge in communal

knowledge and discourse in order to force his own
interpretation and vent his own insecurities.

His personal

interpretations have become, in part, indistinguishable from
dominant social ones, thus ensuring his position.
Ultimately, Bradshaw is merely an agent of the larger social
forces he serves.

He bears responsibility as a member of a

profession in which the abuse of often limited and
incomplete knowledge can be devastating.
Bradshaw's ability to conform to communal interpretive
structures characterizes his passion for order.

Through a

single symbol, Woolf aptly presents Bradshaw as the
quintessential orderer of discourse.

Throughout the novel,

several objects take on symbolic value as signs:

Peter

Walsh's knife, Richard Dalloway's roses, and Dr. Bradshaw's
pink card.

Each character's reaction to these signs

reflects their epistemology.

Bradshaw's pink card becomes a

fitting objective correlative for the move to ward off the
danger of the unfathomable by classifying, naming, and
confining it.

While the card' may be a benign pink, it

signifies Bradshaw's limited epistemological notions.

For

Bradshaw, it is inconceivable that individual meaning could
be any different from collective meaning— they should be as
inseparable as two sides of a piece of paper, of a pink
filing card.

Bradshaw assumes that what he writes on the

card is "truth" based on scientific, rational knowledge.

He

does not recognize that the words simply gain power as
"truth" because they conform to the discourse.

Thus, Dr.

Bradshaw wielding the power accorded him by society and
merited by his professional knowledge, systematically treats
by exclusion those who defy traditional norms of
interpretation.
Perhaps because he lacks specific psychiatric
knowledge, Dr. Holmes is a more damaging

interpretive

figure than Dr. Bradshaw. Holmes misinterprets by denying
the existence of an illness.

Lacking a more sophisticated

discourse for interpretation, Dr. Holmes places Septimus's
disconcerting behavior in a personal context:

Septimus is

simply "in a funk," a malady that even plagues the doctor
himself— easily cured by a round of golf or an outing to the
symphony (139).

By comparing Septimus's illness to his own

needs for a holiday, Holmes ignores the severity of
Septimus's illness and imposes his own meaning on the young
man.

Holmes's interpretation lacks the power of Bradshaw's
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psychiatric discourse because it does not draw upon the
strength of complex medical terminology.

The phrase, "in a

funk," cannot compare with "a case of complete breakdown."
"In a funk" does not suggest the power of medical authority,
whereas "a case of complete breakdown" bears the weight of
an institution.

Holmes employs questionable, if less

imposing, language to control and safely categorize
Septimus*s malady.
significance:

He persists in minimizing its

"Dr. Holmes came again.

Large, fresh

coloured, handsome, flicking his boots, looking in the
glass, he brushed it all aside— headaches, sleeplessness,
fears, dreams— nerve symptoms and nothing more"

(138).

At

this point, Holmes could appear a benign but ignorant fool.
However, in his ignorance, Holmes proves a far more forceful
and dangerous healer.
Woolf emphasizes this by replicating Holmes's disregard
for Septimus*s symptoms in the doctor's physical
brusqueness:

Holmes physically forces or brushes aside

Rezia Smith on two different occasions.

The first instance

in which Holmes's gestures mimic his professional stance
occurs during a house call.
will not see him.
such wishes:

Rezia informs him that Septimus

Dr. Holmes, "smiling agreeably," ignores

"Really he had to give that charming little

lady, Mrs. Smith, a friendly push before he could get past
her into her husband's bedroom" (138).

Holmes invades the

Smith's home on a medical prerogative.

In place of the

specialized knowledge which authorizes Bradshaw, Holmes

28

invokes another form of knowledge and power— professional
experience.

As a physician with "forty years' experience,"

Holmes expects cooperation from the couple who, after all,
have gone to him for help.

Although unwilling to admit that

Septimus is in anything more than a funk, Holmes does at
times read Septimus's illness as a serious breach of
traditional "English" values.

In condescending tones,

Holmes stresses the importance of societal norms:
He [Septimus] had actually talked of killing
himself to his wife, quite a girl, a foreigner,
wasn't she?

Didn't that give her a very odd idea

of English husbands?
duty to one's wife?

Didn't one owe perhaps a
Wouldn't it be better to do

something instead of lying in bed?

(13 9)

Woolf ironizes the bumbling general practitioner.

However,

this scene is not simply a comic tableau of the doctor's
ineptness, for it is one in a series of interviews which
ultimately lead to Septimus's suicide.

Through questions he

clearly deems rhetorical, Holmes urges Septimus to adopt
collective meaning and habits.

Without the sophistication

of a Dr. Bradshaw, Holmes essentially accuses Septimus of
violating the rules of discourse by failing to conform to
behavioral norms.
By violating behavioral norms, Septimus has apparently
relinquished any personal liberties.
physical forcing emphasizes this.
dies, Rezia bars Holmes's way, "No.

Dr. Holmes's second

Just before Septimus
I will not allow you to
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see my husband."

Woolf then leads the reader into the

doctor's perspective: "He could see her, like a little hen,
with her wings spread barring his passage.
persevered.

But Holmes

'My dear lady, allow me . . .' Holmes said,

putting her aside (Holmes was a powerfully built man)"
(225).

Thus, Holmes acts in a violent, abusive, and

threatening way, disregarding the wishes of his patient.

He

insists upon bullying them into accepting his interpretation
of Smith's illness, thus precipitating Septimus's reluctant
suicide.

Through Holmes, Woolf illustrates that the

possession of a little knowledge in conjunction with the
authority of position can be more lethal than a great deal
of knowledge.
Septimus's opposition to the doctors seems an extreme
example of highly restrictive forces combatting a much less
systematic

participation in the society's discourse of

power, knowledge, and interpretation.

The themes

crystallized in the Septimus Smith narrative become more
multi-faceted and complex in Clarissa Dalloway's sphere of
influence.

The Septimus Smith narrative gains credibility

as Woolf presents the themes of his narrative in the life of
a middle-class, enfranchised member of society.

Rather than

the one-sided attack Septimus finds himself a victim of,
Clarissa finds herself surrounded by people operating in a
web of conflicting orders or structures for establishing
meaning— Christianity, social rhetoric, social reform, and
intellectualism.

Various characters utilize these orders to
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compose "readings" of Clarissa and force her into an
acceptance of their interpretations.
Doris Kilman, one of Mrs. Dalloway's more antagonistic
satellites, employs the order of Christian doctrine to
produce interpretations.

Although Miss Kilman is clearly

less powerful than the Drs. Bradshaw and Holmes, she, too,
attempts to constrain interpretations— especially those of
Clarissa Dalloway— in the name of "truth."

Clarissa's first

description of Miss Kilman uses language which echoes the
characterizations of Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw.

Clarissa

calls her "one of those spectres who stand astride us and
suck up half our life-blood, dominators and tyrants" (1617).

Admittedly, Clarissa's resentment of Miss Kilman's

friendship with her daughter Elizabeth colors her
characterization, as does her supercilious classconsciousness exemplified by her repeated formula, "Miss
Kilman in her mackintosh"

(186).

However, these

qualifications do not alter the accuracy of Mrs. Dalloway's
assessment.

In fact, Miss Kilman verifies such a reading on

a number of occasions.

For example, while taking tea with

Elizabeth, she reflects, "If she could grasp her
[Elizabeth], if she could clasp her, if she could make her
hers absolutely and forever and then die; that was all she
wanted"

(199-200).

Doris Kilman's desire to possess

corresponds to the controlling maneuvers of both Drs. Holmes
and Bradshaw.

While Holmes and Bradshaw act to serve the

public good, Doris Kilman's motivation is intensely
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personal—

sexual desire disguised as religious or

educational motivation.

Nonetheless, Kilman's impulse to

control replicates the misguided force behind the doctors'
attempts to treat Septimus.

However, there is a marked

difference between the power these two men exercise and that
which Kilman aspires to and believes she possesses.
Kilman's power is essentially illusory, simply a construct
of words, while the power of the doctors is tangible and
sanctioned by society.

Herein, according to Foucault, lies

the irony of power (1156).

Humans covet the promise of

power, but do not recognize that it is nothing more than a
construct of language, a discourse to which only certain
members of society will ever be allowed access.

Power only

results from the ability to possess and use the discourse.
While the doctors' power is also a construct of language,
their words are invested with a power that Doris Kilman can
never possess.

Kilman, as a middle-aged, unmarried woman

who sympathized with Germany during the World War, violates
traditional social norms.

She has, in fact, been excluded

by society as a result of her war time sympathies:

"It was

true that the family was of German origin; spelt the name
Kiehlman in the eighteenth century; but her brother had been
killed.

They turned her out because she would not pretend

that the Germans were all villains"

(187).

Because she

refused to accept an interpretation predominant during the
war against Germany, Kilman was banished.

Ironically,

however, Kilman, blinded by the lure of power, employs the
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very methods whose force and language marginalized her in
the first place.
Because Kilman feels her social insignificance, she
attempts to gain leverage by the use of exclusive and
excluding knowledge.

Several times, Miss Kilman reminds

herself that "Her knowledge of modern history was more than
respectable"

(200).

No longer able to use that knowledge as

a means to socially sanctioned respectability and authority,
Miss Kilman must adopt a new method to gain precedence.

She

manipulates the doctrines of Christianity to produce a
reading of Clarissa which suits her own predisposition to
resent the wealthy housewife.

Kilman is able to pity

Clarissa by assigning her a place in a far more imposing
interpretive structure, one whose transcendent claims
outshine the superficial hierarchies of the Dalloway world.
Christian doctrine embraces all members of society, teaches
that it is more difficult for the rich to reach the kingdom
of God, and offers as its icon a penniless carpenter.

Thus,

Christianity is readily accessible and appealing to the
disenfranchised Kilman and, through it, she disguises her
personal interpretation of Clarissa Dalloway in the communal
rhetoric of doctrine.
The precepts of Christianity give Miss Kilman the power
to pity the wealthy.

She recalls the shift in her

interpretive structure:

"Then Our Lord had come to her (and

here she always bowed her head).
years and three months ago.

She had seen the light two

Now she did not envy women like
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Clarissa Dalloway; she pitied them" (187-188).

Regardless

of its illusory nature, such power satisfies Kilman's
penchant for domination:

"So now, whenever the hot and

painful feelings boiled within her, this hatred of Mrs.
Dalloway, this grudge against the world, she thought of God"
(188).

Ironically, it is precisely this power to pity that

might have characterized Clarissa's general reaction to Miss
Kilman before she came to detest the woman's influence on
Elizabeth.

Thus, through religious discourse Miss Kilman

attempts a reversal of the power relationship between
herself and her employer.

If she cannot possess the social

stature of a Mrs. Dalloway, she can achieve

satisfaction in

supposed moral superiority by adopting the language of
Christianity.

Foucault notes that religious doctrines

establish a unit of people defined by their common beliefs
(1162).

Kilman's adherence to Christian doctrine insures

that she is now at the center of a social discourse from
which Clarissa is excluded.
Much as Drs. Bradshaw and Holmes manipulate their
professional knowledge to suit personal prejudices, so Miss
Kilman tempers her desire for domination with the rhetoric
of Christianity:
And there rose in her an overmastering desire to
overcome her [Clarissa]; to unmask her.

If she

could have felled her it would have eased her.
But it was not the body; it was the soul and its
mockery that she wished to subdue; make feel her
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mastery.

If only she could make her weep; could

ruin her; humiliate her; bring her to her knees
crying, You are right!
not Miss Kilman's.
victory.

But this was God's will,

It was to be a religious

So she glared; so she glowered.

(189)

Miss Kilman describes here an ecstatic conversion in which
she acts as priest to the weeping, penitent Clarissa
Dalloway.

The fact that this is more than a "religious

victory" is quite clear.

Like Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw,

Miss Kilman actually seeks to force her interpretation;
Clarissa must validate the Kilman reading of her wasteful
life by crying, "You are right!"

Of course, because Kilman

has no real power in social currency, she is incapable of
the type of damage Holmes and Bradshaw wreck.

Elizabeth

easily escapes her grasp after their outing to the Shops.
Thus, Kilman simply becomes an example of a marginalized
figure who adopts the very moves that rendered her powerless
in the first place.

Kilman illustrates that even the

marginalized individual who has been brutalized by the
discourse can regard its promise of power as compensation
for its accompanying evils.
Doris Kilman bases her illusory sense of power on the
transcendent scheme of Christianity; in contrast, Hugh
Whitbread grounds his power in the less ideologically
centered, but no less forceful, order of social rhetoric.
Hugh's rhetorical abilities have earned him a position of
influence in the most visible structure of societal

authority, the court.

Despite the fact that friends mock

him for "his little job at court," Hugh exercises a great
deal of power through the manipulation of language (7).

In

Foucault's terms, Hugh creates "truth" by conforming ideas
to the established interpretive guidelines.

It is this

ability which makes him serviceable to Lady Bruton:

"Hugh .

. . thus marvellously reduced Lady Bruton's tangles to
sense, to grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady
Bruton felt, watching the marvellous transformation, must
respect"

(166).

By transforming Lady Bruton's notions into

words which the Times editor "must respect," Hugh produces
"truth" which conforms to the limits of the discourse.

Lady

Bruton feels that if Hugh writes for her, she will be "sure
of being somehow right"

(166).

Although Hugh's efforts seem

no more than a sycophantic attempt to satisfy the demands of
a social superior, they do exercise a great deal of
interpretive force.

Hugh converts to reason Lady Bruton's

absurd notion that she can sway scores of young people to
emigrate to Canada and thus alleviate the population
problems resulting from World War I.

Lady Bruton and Hugh

Whitbread participate in an activity which normalizes the
disturbing results of the war and provides simple solutions
to the unsettling problems that the dysfunctional Septimus
Smith embodies.
Richard Dalloway also attends this luncheon at Lady
Bruton's.

Unlike Hugh, Richard observes the letter-writing

ritual, but does not actively participate.

Richard holds a
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prominent and recognizable position of political power; yet,
he seems much less eager to impose his interpretations on
others and respects individual meaning.

He readily

pronounces Hugh Whitbread's rhetoric "all stuffing and
bunkum, but no harm in it" (167).

However, such a dismissal

highlights Richard's own blindness to the dangers inherent
/

in any effort to influence others.
In fact, Richard represents yet another constraining
order, that of social reform.

The reformer, like a Dr.

Holmes or Bradshaw, operates under the mandate of society to
correct trouble-spots— the displaced, the homeless, the
jobless.

The reformer attempts to provide acceptable

solutions to problems which reveal society's inadequacies.
While walking through London, Richard notices several such
problems:

children crossing the street unattended,

prostitutes and female vagrants (175).
concerning prostitutes in particular:

Richard reflects
"The fault wasn't in

them, nor in young men either, but in our detestable social
system and so forth" (175).

Richard's comment appears a

clear denunciation of the system, not the participants.
However, the rather flippant tone of "and so forth" lessens
the force of his declaration.
The encounter with the female vagrant highlights
Richard's more passive stance.

At sight of the woman,

Richard wonders "what could be done for female vagrants"
(17 6).

Despite his apparent concern, he does not ask the

woman for an answer:

"Intent he passed her; still there was

37

time for a spark between them— she laughed at the sight of
him, he smiled good-humouredly, considering the problem of
the female vagrant; not that they would' ever speak” (176).
Richard does not engage the woman in conversation.
remains the object of idle inquiry.

She

Ironically, Richard,

the social reformer, does not attempt to transgress the
social structure which dictates that a man of his class
would not speak with a street woman.

In terms of his duties

as social reformer, Richard primarily functions to maintain
appearances within the social structure.

Seen in this

light, he seems uncomfortably close to the doctors who sweep
problems under the rug or out the window.

Nonetheless, the

gentle humor of this scene marks Richard as a less
threatening guardian of the social order.

A parity exists

between Richard and the vagrant which is absent in the
relationship between the doctors and Septimus; the vagrant
laughs at the sight of Richard bearing flowers, while he
smiles "good-humouredly."
Richard's interpretive moves on the personal level
deserve examination.

Like the other characters, Richard

develops interpretations to accommodate the unknown or
threatening which confronts him.

During her luncheon, Lady

Bruton mentions Peter Walsh's return to England. This
reappearance of his rival sparks in Richard a case of male
jealousy.

Richard counters this uncertainty by reminding

himself that Clarissa chose him:

"But she had often said to

him that she had been right not to marry Peter Walsh; which,

knowing Clarissa, was obviously true; she wanted support.
Not that she was weak; but she wanted support"
added).

(177 emphasis

Here Richard finds it necessary to develop a

reading of Clarissa that will assuage his own feelings of
insecurity.

He reasons that Clarissa chose him because he

offered a support she needed, a support which Peter Walsh
could not provide.

Richard justifies his own existence by

such a reading of his wife.

However, the reader will

remember that Clarissa chose Richard not only because she
needed support, but also because Peter demanded to share, to
know too much.

The ironic insertion of "knowing Clarissa"

strikes a discordant note with the information which follows
it.

By stating that Clarissa married him because he could

offer support, Richard unwittingly reveals precisely how
little he knows about his wife.

Despite his mistake,

Richard's interpretive self-validation does comparatively
little harm.

Woolf does not portray Richard forcing such a

reading onto Clarissa.
Regardless of Richard's very human, if slightly
misguided interpretation, the interpretive gestures of his
private life seem less troublesome than those of other
figures in the novel.

Clarissa notes the importance of

individual privacy in her marriage:
And there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even
between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must
respect, thought Clarissa, watching him [Richard]
open the door; for one would not part with it
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oneself, or take it, against his will, from one's
husband, without losing one's independence, one's
self-respect— something, after all, priceless.
(181)
Despite the fact that Richard has been planning to return
home after his luncheon in order to say "I love you" to
Clarissa, he does not do so.

He recognizes the invasion a

declaration of love would be and simply gives Clarissa the
flowers:

"But he could not bring himself to say he loved

her; not in so many words"

(179).

Such a declaration gives

the speaker leverage in the relationship as it forces the
partner into a reciprocal gesture, obliquely pushing them
into a statement which dovetails with the phrase, "I love
you."

Although Richard does not speak, he communicates with

Clarissa,

"But how lovely, she said, taking his flowers.

She understood; she understood without his speaking; his
Clarissa"

(179).

Richard, perhaps rendered understandably

insecure by the reappearance of his rival Peter Walsh, needs
the affirmation of hearing, "I love you," yet he does not
yield to such an impulse.

In this, Richard contrasts

sharply with Peter who makes his passionate feelings for
Clarissa oppressively plain.

Richard hesitates once more

before leaving, "He must be off, he said, getting up.

But -

he stood for a moment as if he were about to say something;
and she wondered what?

Why?

There were the roses"

(181).

Clarissa emphasizes the superfluity of words at such a
moment; the roses have been sufficiently eloquent. The
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beauty of this moment is that neither individual has to
vocalize their interpretation, but silently they share a
very similar reading of the incident— a moment of
interpretive mutuality.
Much as the pink card embodies Bradshaw's closed
epistemology, so the roses resonate as a sign of Richard's
methods for interpreting and establishing knowledge.

Woolf

describes Richard "grasping his red and white roses together
(a vast bunch in tissue paper)" (174).

Richard's roses are

an unruly lot, certainly not ordered as are Bradshaw's
cards.

In fact, Richard must grasp them in a lighthearted

gesture to prevent losing them.

If the roses become a sign

of knowledge or interpretation, then we see that Richard
only confines out of necessity and does not do so in a very
systematic fashion.

In fact, only a thin layer of tissue

confines them, not the hard card of Bradshaw.

Richard's

roses also underline his contrast to Peter Walsh.

As he

walks past the female vagrant, Richard bears "his flowers
like a weapon"

(176).

This simile should remind readers of

Peter Walsh who carries a weapon throughout the novel, his
knife.

The comparison presents Richard as an even

friendlier interpretive agent, one whose weapon is nothing
more than a bouquet of flowers meant to say "I love you,"
flowers which could easily have another meaning.
This more positive reading of Richard, however,

is

undercut slightly by an incident which shows him capable of
imposing an interpretation on Clarissa.

Clarissa reflects
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that both Richard and Peter "criticised her very unfairly,
laughed at her very unjustly, for her parties"

(183).

Typically, Richard*s interpretation steins from his
humanitarian agenda:

"Richard merely thought it foolish of

her to like excitement when she knew it was bad for her
heart" (183).
criticism:

Clarissa easily defends herself against such

"And both were quite wrong.

simply life"

(183).

What she liked was

Again, Richard's reading does not harm

his wife; however, the significance of this incident lies in
the comparison of Richard and Peter.

Clarissa pairs the two

figures, suggesting some similarity between Richard and
Peter who, as is shown below, is a more threatening
interpreter.
Woolf's opposition of Peter and Richard highlights
their differing interpretive strategies.

Clarissa notes

that her relationship with Peter was one of words.

They

argued frequently and Peter often pointed out "the defects
of her own soul"

(9).

Clarissa muses,

"How he scolded her!

How they argued"

(9).

When Peter returns to London, he

abuses the privilege of friendship by making his distaste
for Clarissa's life very apparent.

Like Doris Kilman, Peter

finds himself an outsider and turns for support to a type of
intellectual superiority vaguely based on youthful socialist
leanings.

Peter attempts to reverse the power relationship-

-placing the wealthier and more influential Clarissa in a
lower position— by appealing to intellectual superiority.
Woolf tempers her portrayal of Peter, however, with the
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somewhat comic phallic symbol of the knife.

Peter manifests

a need for personal authority by fidgeting with his rather
pathetic recourse to power, his knife:

11And he took out his

knife quite openly— his old horn-handled knife” (65).
Peter's apparently impotent knife allows for a contrast
between himself and the more efficiently violent Dr. Holmes.
Both Holmes and Peter make notable entries into two
different homes.

Holmes forces his way up the stairs into

the Smith's home, and Peter rushes past the maid and up the
stairs to Clarissa.

Peter arrives at Mrs. Dalloway's home:

»*Mrs. Dalloway will see me . . . .

Oh yes, she will see

m e , ' he repeated, putting Lucy aside very benevolently, and
running upstairs ever so quickly"

(59).

The contrast in

responses to the two entries reveals a significant
difference between Peter and Dr. Holmes.

Holmes's violence

results in Septimus's suicide, while Peter causes only a
minor shuffle as he violates Clarissa's privacy.

Clarissa's

actions emphasize that Peter does make an invasion of sorts:
"She made to hide her dress, like a virgin protecting
chastity, respecting privacy"

(59).

When compared to Dr.

Holmes, Peter seems a failed attempt to approximate
masculine authority.

Woolf pokes fun at Peter who through

his knife and intrusive nature makes a show of employing
tactics which truly do not serve him.
In addition to his failed attempts to employ more
forceful tactics, Peter relies on a sense of intellectual
superiority.

Like the other characters, Peter is pushed
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into an interpretation by personal insecurities.

While

Peter visits with Clarissa, his surroundings make him feel
his own failure:

"Oh yes, he had no doubt about that; he

was a failure, compared with all this— the inlaid table, the
mounted paper-knife, the dolphin and the candlesticks, the
chair-covers and the old valuable English tinted prints"
(64).

However, this sense of failure changes to disdain,

much as Miss Kilman's sense of powerlessness transforms into
pity.

Peter thinks, "I detest the smugness of the whole

affair" (65).

Peter, a socialist in his youth, calls upon

his intellectual disdain to shore up his distaste for the
upper classes whose security he envies.
is the outsider.

Like Kilman, Peter

He intends to ask Richard Dalloway to help

him find a new post and requires an alternative system of
interpretation to reverse his own position of relative
powerlessness.

However, unlike Kilman, Peter has enduring

ties to Clarissa and avoids the forceful insistence
necessary to impose his interpretation of Clarissa on his
old friend.

Thus, he does not utilize his sense of

intellectual superiority to denounce Clarissa entirely.
Nonetheless, the insecure Peter uses language very similar
to Doris Kilman's:

"I know what I'm up against, he thought,

running his finger along the blade of his knife, Clarissa
and Dalloway and all the rest of them; but I'll show
Clarissa"

(69).

He wants to "show Clarissa," much as Kilman

wants "to overcome her; to unmask her"

(189).

Kilman wishes

to make Clarissa cry; however, in this scene Peter is the
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one who cries, ironically linking Peter more closely to
traditionally female traits rather than the masculine knife
he clings to.

Although he yearns to force his meaning and

validate himself in the eyes of the Dalloway set, he is
incapable of such a move.
Although Peter's social status is outside the ruling
class, his personal epistemology reflects, to a certain
extent, the eighteenth-century rationalism supporting such
Western power structures.

In fact, Clarissa acknowledges

that for Peter knowing was simply a matter of studying and
reading.

Clarissa muses:
Take Peter Walsh now.

There was a man, charming,

clever, with ideas about everything.

If you

wanted to know about Pope, say, or Addison, or
just to talk nonsense, what people were like, what
things meant, Peter knew better than any one.

It

was Peter who had helped her; Peter who had lent
her books.

(192)

Thus, although Peter has landed outside the realm of the
powerful elite, he, like Kilman, embraces the underpinnings
of the system which banished him, perhaps seeing in logic
and reason a structure whose methods inspire belief by their
systematized nature.

Ironically, Peter frequently knows

very little about "what people were like," or "what things
meant."

In fact, as is seen below, he even misapprehends

his old and intimate friend Clarissa.

Peter's intellectual

superiority seems something of a fraud; he is able to fool
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Clarissa by his "learning," yet he lacks a genuine
understanding of people.
The limitations of Peter's rationalism and
intellectualism are revealed in his persistent
misunderstanding of human beings, specifically Clarissa.
For example, after noting the elegant surroundings of
Clarissa's drawing-room, Peter asserts, "Richard's doing,
not Clarissa's; save that she married him" (65).

While the

objects themselves and the money that supplied them are
Richard's "doing," the decor of the room is a direct result
of Clarissa's own preparations for the party.

In fact,

Clarissa reflects, "But Richard had no notion of the look of
a room"

(181).

Peter seems unwilling to acknowledge a part

of Clarissa (her social savvy) which might not correspond to
his own interpretation of her.

Regarding Peter, Clarissa

notes "his lack of the ghost of a notion what any one else
was feeling"

(69).

However, in the very next line, we read:

"I know all that, Peter thought; I know what I'm up against,
he thought, running his finger along the blade of his knife"
(69).

The repetition of the verb "know" highlights Peter's

own lack of self-knowledge, the fact that he knows very
little about human relationships and finds validation for
his misapprehension in his knife.
Significantly, Peter misunderstands Clarissa herself.
Peter believes she gives her parties because she enjoys
imposing herself; but Clarissa disagrees, declaring Peter
wrong and adding, "What she liked was simply life" (18 3).
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Clarissa continues, "But could any man understand what she
meant either? about life? She could not imagine Peter or
Richard taking the trouble to give a party for no reason
whatever" (184).

She indicates her parties are an attempt

to help people connect, to bring them together:
an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom?
offering for the sake of offering, perhaps.
her gift" (185).

"And it.was
An

Anyhow, it was

Peter's dismissal of the parties as a

symptom of social snobbery does not account for Clarissa's
true motivation and emphasizes his limited understanding of
her.
While Clarissa rather successfully deflects Richard
Dalloway's moment of interpretive imposition, she finds it
more difficult to dispel the force of Peter's readings.
Clarissa shows a marked disregard for Richard's efforts at
social reform, paying little heed to whether his committee
meets to discuss the Albanians or the Armenians (182).
Perhaps because she finds Peter's intellectualism more
imposing, Clarissa feels his reading of her more profoundly.
Clarissa has difficulty laughing off Peter's analysis of her
parties and comments on how insignificant and trivial she
feels in Peter's presence.

Clearly, his interpretation

meets its mark.
Like Dr. Bradshaw's pink card and Richard Dalloway's
roses, Peter's knife functions as a sign of his
epistemology.

In its potential for violence, the knife

marks Peter as an aggressive and threatening interpreter,

one willing to use force and yet incapable of doing so.
Phyllis Rose notes that the obvious phallic implications of
the knife make Peter a "vaguely menacing, aggressive" figure
(142).

Clarissa herself acknowledges the knife as a means

of imposing interpretations: "What an extraordinary habit
that was, Clarissa thought; always playing with a knife.
Always making one feel, too, frivolous; empty-minded; a mere
silly chatterbox, as he used" (65).

While Peter partially

redeems himself by failing to achieve the out-moded
masculine authority of Dr. Holmes, he must be held
accountable for the fact that he attempts to approximate the
force of such a position.

Peter*s self-deceit and lack of

intuition characterizes a generation of men who embrace
rationalism yet remain ignorant to the mystery of existence
which so fascinates Clarissa, Septimus, and Woolf herself.
Woolf emphasizes the limitations of Peter's
intellectualism by contrasting his understanding with that
of the less educated, yet more insightful, Clarissa.
Clarissa notes, "But Peter— however beautiful the day might
be, and the trees and the grass, and the little girl in
pink— Peter never saw a thing of all that.

He would put on

his spectacles, if she told him to; he would look" (9).
Clarissa must point to things of significance, and while she
indicates that Peter would put on his glasses and look, she
does not affirm that he actually sees or attaches meaning to
the natural world.

The mystery of the natural world

motivates the epistemologies of both Clarissa and Septimus
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and forms an alternative to the various orders and
discourses vying for their allegiance.

This awareness of

the mystery of existence links Clarissa and Septimus and
predominates Woolf's depiction of Clarissa herself.
Within the first ten pages of the novel, Woolf
establishes Mrs. Dalloway as a woman who readily accepts the
limited nature of knowledge and the mystery of existence.
In fact, Clarissa scoffs at any attempts to confine the
essence of existence in the formulas of science, logic, and
language.

Her relationship with Richard upholds the

barriers between individuals and guards against interpretive
bullying:

"For in marriage a little license, a little

independence there must be between people living together
day in day out in the same house; which Richard gave her,
and she him" (10).

Clarissa preserves the integrity of

individual privacy:
for instance?

"(Where was he [Richard] this morning

Some committee, she never asked what.)"

(10).

Clarissa refrains from asking for information as simple as
which committee Richard is attending, setting her apart from
the transparently villainous doctors and the more subtly
disturbing Peter Walsh.

Several questions focus this

examination of Clarissa:

1) As do other characters, does

Clarissa develop interpretations to justify herself?

2) How

does she function when confronted by the various orders
surrounding her?

3) And, more importantly, what part does

she play in the imposition of interpretation?
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Initially, Clarissa seems to resist the need to impose
interpretations on others in that she refuses to categorize
individuals.

She determines: "She would not say of Peter,

she would not say of herself, I am this, I am that" (11).
Her refusal to classify by using the demonstrative pronoun
suggests her acceptance of limited meaning and the infinite
possibilities of experience.

Herbert Marder notes that this

passage reveals Clarissa's "impulse to ignore rational
categories, to celebrate the integrity of every living
person, without regard for creeds or doctrines"

(57).

Clarissa's stance opposes the orders of Dr. Bradshaw's
psychiatry, Doris Kilman's Christianity, Richard's
humanitarianism, and Peter Walsh's rationalism.

She rejects

each order's basic compulsion to classify and control what
Foucault terms the proliferation of meaning (1164).
Despite this renunciation of categorization, Clarissa
proceeds to use demonstrative pronouns profusely, not only
in relation to herself, but also in her assessment of other
individuals.

In fact, only a few pages after this

renunciation,

Clarissa laments that she cannot be like

Richard who does things for himself, but that she does
things "to make people think this or that" (14).
appositive,

The

"perfect idiocy she knew," qualifies the force

of such a manipulative admission.

The fact remains that

Clarissa admits she acts in order to force people into
thinking "this or that," a move to convince others of her
interpretations.

However, such a move to invite certain
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interpretations of herself remains worlds apart from the
force the doctors use in treating Septimus.

In addition,

one could argue that in her "instinctive11 knowledge of
people— "Her only gift was knowing people almost by
instinct"—

Clarissa labels and diagnoses in much the same

way that the physicians Holmes and Bradshaw do (11).
Admittedly, Clarissa's "instinct" cannot command the power
Holmes and Bradshaw wield.

Instinct, as a personal form of

knowledge, is also a devalued form of meaning in Woolf's
society.

Clarissa's instincts can only govern the small

sphere of her home and her party, and that, too,

is limited.

While Clarissa instinctively dislikes Dr. Bradshaw,

his

position in society dictates that he be invited.
In entertaining Bradshaw, Clarissa finds herself
virtually a slave to the dictates of the social system;
however, in her treatment and classification of the lower
class and dependent Kilman, Clarissa herself exercises that
same class-conscious authority.

Perhaps most striking, as

Marder notes, is Clarissa's savage denunciation and
classification of Miss Kilman as "One of those spectres who
stand astride us and suck up half our life-blood, dominators
and tyrants" (16-17).

Marder comments ironically,

for Clarissa's refusal to pin a label on 'anyone
world.'"

(59).

"So much

in the

Marder rightfully points out the

inconsistency in Clarissa; yet he ignores information that
partially justifies her categorization.

Marder does not

account for the fact that the language Clarissa uses to
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describe Miss Kilman echoes that used by Woolf to discuss
the tyrants Holmes and Bradshaw.
To some extent, Clarissa*s treatment of Miss Kilman
actually highlights her personal restraint.

Like the other

characters, Clarissa develops interpretations which justify
her own existence in moments of psychological insecurity.
Wounded by Elizabeth's departure to the stores with Miss
Kilman, Clarissa unleashes an interpretive tirade:
Love and religion!

. . . How detestable, how

detestable they are!

. . . The cruelest things in

the world . . . seeing them clumsy, hot,
domineering, hypocritical, eavesdropping, jealous,
infinitely cruel and unscrupulous, dressed in a
mackintosh coat, on the landing; love and
religion.

Had she ever tried to convert any one

herself?

Did she not wish everybody merely to be

themselves?

(191)

This passage seems consistent with Clarissa's earlier
determination to refuse the use of the demonstrative
pronouns in defining individuals and interpreting character.
However, only a page prior to this assertion that she has
never tried to "convert'' anyone, she thinks, "Miss Kilman,
in a mackintosh, whom Heaven knows Clarissa would have liked
to help"

(190).

Clarissa's help would be in its own way a

form of conversion, transforming the malevolent, bitter
woman by removing her mackintosh and creating a more
socially acceptable, less threatening member of the
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household.

Miss Kilman would be coopted by the structure

and thus rendered powerless, no longer a threat.

Such a

move seems remarkably close to methods which Drs. Holmes and
Bradshaw employ to subdue Septimus Smith.

However, the fact

remains that Clarissa does not perform any such act
throughout the novel.

She does not reform Miss Kilman, and

although she dislikes "poor Ellie Henderson," she does not
attempt to change her and grudgingly invites her to the
party.
It would seem that to a certain degree Clarissa avoids
the compulsion to gain power through knowledge.

During her

morning walk through London, Mrs. Dalloway proudly itemizes
her scant collection of traditional knowledge:

"How she had

got through life on the few twigs of knowledge Fraulein
Daniels gave them she could not think.

She knew nothing; no

language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except
memoirs in bed" (11).

Here Clarissa misapprehends herself

because she has accepted others' views of her.

She does, in

fact, have a profound understanding of the world, a
knowledge that exceeds the learning of Richard or Peter.
Clarissa has had little formal or traditional education and
finds existence itself an infinite source of meaning and
wonder:

"And yet to her it was absolutely absorbing; all

this; the cabs passing"

(11).

For Clarissa, existence

defies explication by any rational system.
her skepticism:

Clarissa voices
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Why creeds and prayers and mackintoshes?

when,

thought Clarissa, that's the miracle, that's the
mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could
see going from chest of drawers to dressing-table
. . . . And the supreme mystery which Kilman might
say she had solved, or Peter might say he had
solved, but Clarissa didn't believe either of them
had the ghost of an idea of solving, was simply
this:

here was one room; there another.

(193)

Here Clarissa voices her strongest denunciation of what
Foucault terms the will to truth.
kinship with Septimus Smith.

Herein lies her closest

Just as Septimus conjectures

that there may be no meaning at all, so Clarissa, in a less
daring move, suggests that the order of reason does not
possess the power to comprehend the mystery of existence.
This similarity also contains the essence of the difference
between the two characters.

Septimus denies the very

possibility of meaning while Clarissa simply asserts
reason's inability to articulate absolute meaning.
Unlike Septimus, Clarissa will never be a great threat
to the social structure.

Clarissa has married into the

ruling class of male authority from which she gains her own
l

social status.

She is surrounded by individuals

perpetuating various discursive orders.
revolutionary leanings are controlled.

Thus, her more
Perhaps then, it is

the safety of the ruling class which saves her from
Septimus's fate.

Woolf suggests, however, that Clarissa
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survives not simply because she is a socially advantaged
individual.

Rather, perhaps, Clarissa persists where

Septimus dies because she allows the possibility of meaning,
but at the same time opens the door for an alternative to
the socially established system of rationality.

In

opposition to a system whose goal is the acquisition of
power, Clarissa offers meaning through connection with other
humans.

Clarissa acknowledges her experience of such a

connection:
Odd affinities she had with people she had never
spoken to, some woman in the street, some man
behind a counter— even trees, or barns.

It ended

in a transcendental theory which, with her horror
of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she
believed (for all her scepticism), that since our
apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so
momentary compared with the other, the unseen part
of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might
survive, be recovered somehow attached to this
person or that.

(232)

Clarissa hopes that somehow the human spirit survives the
grappling and gritty life of the conscious world because of
these unseen connections.

Significantly, the quotation ends

with her use of the demonstrative pronouns, pronouns used
earlier as means to classify and limit individuals, meaning
and interpretation.

She no longer uses these words to

classify, but merely to indicate the limitless possibilities
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for human connection.

Through the use of the stream-of-

conscious style, Woolf links the minds of her characters as
they reflect upon objects suggesting that language does not
have to be used exclusively as a means for manipulating
knowledge, interpretations, people, or power; it can provide
for connection, no matter how minimal, between human beings.
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